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Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the
Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine
Both the Equal Pay Act of 1963' and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19642 prohibit sex-based wage discrimination. The Equal Pay
Act prohibits an employer from paying unequal wages to men and
women who do work of substantially "equal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility."'3 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 4 Courts inter-
preting Title VII have permitted plaintiffs to establish claims by
showing either disparate treatment5 or disparate impact.6
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); see note 3 infra.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For the text of the pertinent
provisions, see notes 4, 13 & 15 injra.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1) (1976) ("No employer. . . shall discriminate. . . on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees. . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex. . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions . . .
For a discussion of the doctrine, see Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d
416, 420 (5th Cir. 1971); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). On when jobs are substantially equal, see Brennan v. Owens-
boro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1975) (catheterization of male patients, a
duty performed by orderlies about twice a week, did not justify paying orderlies more than
nurses: a "pay differential cannot be justified on the basis of the occasional extra work'), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976); Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.
1974) (similar facts), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1976); cf. Gunther v. County of Washington,
623 F.2d 1303, 1310 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that male and female guards at a county jail did
not perform substantially equal work because each man guarded 10 times the number of
prisoners that each women guarded and because women performed substantial clerical du-
ties), aftdon other grounds, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.').
5. Disparate treatment claims require proof that an employer intentionally discrimi-
nated against women. An employer intentionally discriminates if he uses sex as a factor in an
employment decision. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335
n.15 (1977) ("The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
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Until 1980, courts did not apply Title VII standards to sex-based
wage discrimination; instead, they had interpreted the Bennett
Amendment to Title VIF to require plaintiffs to show a violation of
the Equal Pay Act's equal pay for equal work standard.8 In Count of
Washington v. Gunther,9 the Supreme Court held that the Bennett
Amendment incorporates into Title VII the four affirmative defenses
of the Equal Pay Act,10 but not the unequal pay for equal work re-
quirement. Treating the case as one of disparate treatment, the
Court did not discuss whether the Bennett Amendment precludes all
disparate impact claims of sex-based wage discrimination. The
Court also declined to address whether unequal pay for jobs of "com-
parable worth" violates Title VII.L This note argues that courts
should permit disparate impact claims of sex-based wage discrimina-
tion, but deny disparate impact claims based on evidence of compa-
rable worth.
their. . . sex . . Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situa-
tions be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.').
6. Disparate impact claims do not require proof of intent, and reach practices which,
although facially neutral, operate adversely to affect women. See Dothard v: Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977) (applying the disparate impact doctrine to sex discrimination and
holding that statutory height and weight requirements for prison guards, although facially
neutral, violate Title VII; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).)
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976); see note 13 infra.
8. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Calage v.
University of Tenn., 544 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1976); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511
F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th
Cir. 1971).
9. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); see note 14 infra and accompanying text.
11. A "comparable worth" claim means a claim based on evidence that workers in "fe-
male" jobs earn less than workers in "male" jobs that require comparable skill, effort, and
responsibility. For example,, since most secretaries (99%) are female and most mail clerks
(79%) are male, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PERSPEC IvEs ON
WORKING WOMEN: A DATEBOOK 10 (1980), proof that the skill, effort, and responsibility of
a secretary exceeds that of a mail clerk by 25% and that a particular employer paid secretar-
ies, on the average, the same wages as mail clerks would state a comparable worth case.
For a discussion of comparable worth, see generally, COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES:
EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE (1981) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK, AND
WAGES]; COMPARABLE WORTH, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (E. Livernash ed. 1980); Blum-
rosen, Wage Diirrimination, job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 397,428-57 (1979); Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Ooview, 69
GEo. LJ. 1123 (1981); Gitt & Gelb, Boondthe Equal Pay Act: Fpanding Wage DiferentialProtec-
tiots Under Title VII, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J 723, 723-59 (1977); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage
Discimination and the "Comparable Worth" Teovy in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 231
(1980) (responding to Blumrosen, supra); Note, Equal Pay, Comparable Work, and Job Evaluation,
90 YALE L.J. 657 (1981); Comment, Sex-Based Wage Dircrimination Claims Afer County of
Washington v. Gunther, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1333 (1981).
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Part I of this note sketches the contours of Title VII wage dis-
crimination law prior to and including Gunther. Part II argues that
disparate impact doctrine should apply to sex-based wage discrimi-
nation. Part III argues that Title VII doctrine should not be ex-
tended to include comparable worth claims because such claims,
unlike traditional disparate impact claims, conflict with the policies
underlying Title VII.
I. WAGE DISCRIMINATION PROSCRIPTION UNDER TITLE VII
The Bennett Amendment 12 attempts to reconcile conflicts be-
tween the Equal Pay Act and Title VII by making it lawful under
Title VII "for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex...
if such differentiation is authorized by the [Equal Pay Act]."13 The
Equal Pay Act, however, does not "authorize" any conduct; rather, it
prohibits unequal pay for equal work, and provides four affirmative
defenses to the equal pay requirements. Once a plaintiff has demon-
strated unequal pay for equal work, an employer may escape liability
by proving that any pay difference is due to "(i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quanti-
ty or quality of production; or (iv) . '. . any other factor other than
sex. .. .""1 Title VII explicitly provides an employer with only the
first three of these four defenses.'
Until 1980, courts required Title VII plaintiffs bringing a sex-
based wage discrimination case to prove unequal pay for equal
work.' 6 But the equal pay for equal work standard did little to im-
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The Bennett Amendment is one of two exceptions to
coextensive treatment of race and sex. The other exception permits sex-based discrimination
when sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The full text of the amendment reads: "It shall not
be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid
to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the [Equal Pay Act]."
14. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) ("it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production. . . , provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin").
16. See, e.g., Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v.
Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975);
Ammons v. Zia Co. 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971). The development of this line of cases
stems, strangely enough, from Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970), an Equal Pay Act case which expanded the notion of equal work to
include "substantially equal" work, in order to harmonize the Equal Pay Act with Title VII.
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prove women's wages relative to those of men. 7 The equal work re-
quirement would insulate employers from liability where
discrimination occurs because men predominately staff high-paying
jobs, thereby relegating women to lower-paying positions. Employers
were free to use factors in setting wages which would have been ille-
gal under Title VII had they been used to determine any other con-
dition of employment. Employers were even free to intentionally
discriminate-to decrease wages for jobs because those jobs were
staffed predominately by women. 8
In County of Washington v. Gunther, 9 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, affirmed recent lower court decisions incorporating into Ti-
tle VII the four defenses of the Equal Pay Act.2 ° In Gunther, female
guards in the female section of the Washington County jail were paid
only 70% as much as male guards, even though the County had de-
termined that their jobs were worth 95% as much as the jobs of male
guards guarding male prisoners.2' The plaintiffs had lost in district
court on a claim that their jobs were substantially equal to those of
male guards.22 They claimed that Washington County nevertheless
had violated Title VII by intentionally depressing the female guards'
wages.23
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, interpreted both the
language and legislative history of the Bennett Amendment to incor-
porate into Title VII the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay
The Tenth Circuit, inAmmons, 448 F.2d at 120, incorrectly cited Wheaton Glass for the propo-
sition that a wage discrimination suit under Title VII requires a showing of unequal pay for
equal work. Subsequent cases generally cited Ammons as stating the law on this point, e.g., Di
Salvo, 568 F.2d at 596; Orr, 511 F.2d at 171.
17. Since the passage of Title VII, wages of women have remained near 60% of men's
wages. See, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 11, at 14, 16. This earnings gap is not
explained by age, number of years worked, education, or any other identified factor. See id at
15-24; Levitan, Quinn & Staines, Sex Discimization Against the American Working Women, 15
Ar. BEHAV. SCI. 237 (1971). See generally B. BABCOCK, A. FREEMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross,
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 192-217 (1975); Blumrosen,
supra note 11; Gitt & Gelb, supra note 11.
18. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d
1094, 1100 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1009 (1981).
19. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
20. The Court was affirming the decisions of three courts of appeals. See International
Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied,
449 U.S. 1009 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980);
Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
21. 452 U.S. at 180.
22. 623 F.2d at 1310 (noting that male guards guarded 10 times as many prisoners per
guard as did female guards, and that female guards did considerable clerical work). The
plaintiffs did not raise this claim in the Supreme Court. 452 U.S. at 165.
23. 452 U.S. at 165.
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Act but not the unequal pay for equal work requirement.24 He
found further support for this conclusion in the broad remedial pur-
poses of Title VII, which require the Court to "avoid interpretations
of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, with-
out clear congressional mandate. '2' But Justice Brennan explicitly
refused to discuss the effect of the fourth Equal Pay Act defense-
that an employer can escape liability if the pay difference is due to
any "factor other than sex"--on Title VII litigation.2 6
Incorporation of the fourth defense will not affect proof of intent
under the disparate treatment doctrine.2 ' But whether the fourth de-
fense bars disparate impact claims of sex-based wage discrimination
remains unclear.2 1 Similarly, the narrower but practically more im-
portant question whether proof of unequal pay for jobs of compara-
ble worth states a disparate impact claim remains undecided. 9
24. Id at 168-76. The majority viewed the Bennett Amendment as designed to avoid
statutory conflicts that might arise due to congressional oversight rather than to address a
specific statutory conflict. Id. at 174-75. The legislative history, though not unambiguous,
supports this interpretation. See 110 CONG. REc. 13,647 (1964) (remarks of Senators Bennett
and Dirksen, referring to the amendment as a "technical correction" to provide that "in the
event ofconflts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified") (emphasis added);
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171-75 (1981) (discussing the legislative
history of the Bennett Amendment). But cf. id at 189-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the
Bennett Amendment incorporates into Title VII the entire Equal Pay Act standard).
25. 452 U.S. at 178. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that "Congress balanced the
need for a remedy for wage discrimination against its desire to avoid the burdens associated
with government intervention into wage structures" when it passed Title VII. Id at 203.
26. 452 U.S. at 171.
27. The fourth defense-permitting wage differentials due to "any other factor other
than sex"-does not shield from liability employers who intentionally discriminate, because
intentional discrimination means using sex as a factor. See note 5 supra. Title VII's affirmative
defenses are explicitly available only if employment differences between men and women "are
not the result of an intention to discriminate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The Equal
Pay Act defenses are not explicitly subject to this proviso, but courts require that the senior-
ity, merit, and quantity or quality of work defenses must not be pretexts for intentional sex
discrimination. See EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 1980); Brennan v.
Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. Cf. Note, Age Discrination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837
(1982) (arguing that a "reasonable factors other than age" defense to an age discrimination
suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976), bars
disparate impact suits).
29. 452 U.S. at 166, 180-81. Justice Brennan carefully noted that the plaintiffs' claim
did not require the Court "to make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and
female guard jobs, or attempt by statistical technique or other method to quantify the effect
of sex discrimination on wage rates." Id. at 181. This dicta hints that comparable worth
claims go beyond Title VII's ambit.
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II. DISPARATE IMPACT APPLIED To WAGE DISCRIMINATION
Title VII disparate impact doctrine prohibits employment prac-
tices which disproportionately disadvantage women unless those
practices are sufficiently job-related to meet the "business necessity"
defense.31 Once the plaintiff demonstrates that a particular employ-
ment practice disproportionately affects women,3' the burden shifts
to the defendant to show that the practice in question is "job re-
lated."3 2 If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff may then
show that "other employment practices without a similar discrimina-
tory effect would also 'serve the employer's legitimate interest in "ef-
30. The Supreme Court first articulated the disparate impact doctrine in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (an employment test which disqualifies a greater per-
centage of black job applicants than white job applicants violates Title VII). The Court
extended the doctrine to sex discrimination in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
(invalidating minimum height and weight requirements for prison guard positions). For a
general discussion of disparate impact theory, see Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
31. Plaintiffs can prove disparate impact by focusing on the actual job applicants or
employees affected, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (test disqualified
42% of white job applicants and 94% of black job applicants); Vulcan Soc'y of the New York
City Fire Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 392 (2d Cir. 1973), or by demonstrating
the potential impact on women in general, see, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329-30 (plaintiffs made a prima facie disparate impact case because the minimum height
requirement in question would have excluded 33.29% of women in the United States and
only 1.28% of men); Gr'gs, 401 U.S. at 430 & n.6 (rejecting a high school diploma require-
ment because 34% of white males in North Carolina, but only 12% of black males, had com-
pleted high school).
One court has stated, in dicta, that a plaintiff may make a prima facie disparate impact
claim in a third way-by comparing the composition of the defendant's work force with that
of the appropriate labor market. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1294 (8th Cir.
1975). A gross disparity between the composition of the work force and the labor market,
although not sufficient under the disparate impact doctrine, may suffice to create a prima
facie disparate treatment claim. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
307-08 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 339
n.20 (1977).
32. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Recently some lower courts, citing
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), have stated that the
defendant's burden in a disparate impact case is merely to present evidence of job-relation,
but that at all stages the plaintiff has the burden of proving discrimination. See NAACP v.
The Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
523 F. Supp. 148, 154 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (dicta). But Burdine simply reiterated the existing
allocation of burdens of proof in disparate impact cases. See Board of Trustees of Keene State
College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Most courts recognize that dispa-
rate impact claims "are unaffected by the Supreme Court ruling in Burdine." Heffernan v.
Western Elec. Co., 510 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see also Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.,
657 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Burdine. . . does not address Title VII disparate impact
cases').
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ficient and trustworthy workmanship."'
A. Appf 'ying the Disparate Impact Doctrine to Sex-Based Wage
Discrimination
The disparate impact doctrine furthers a number of social pur-
poses.34 In the abstract, these purposes fully support applying dispa-
rate impact doctrine to sex-based wage discrimination.
First, disparate impact doctrine aids in eliminating covert inten-
tional discrimination.35 Proof of intent, like proof of any state of
mind, is difficult36 since employers can hide discriminatory intent be-
hind a screen of facially neutral factors. The only.evidence of dis-
crimination may be the wage disparity these factors cause.
Second, disparate impact doctrine furthers the social policy of al-
leviating present harm due to past individual or societal discrimina-
tion.37 Prior to the adoption of Title VII, employers often
intentionally depressed women's wages, and because of sex-segrega-
tion in the workplace never had to appropriately increase these
33. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (citations omitted)).
34. See Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Tem-Foreword In Defense of the AntidLsrimination
Pdnple, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 22-54 (1976); Fiss, A Theog ofFair Emploment Laws, 38 U. CHI.
L. REv. 235, 244-49, 296-304 (1971); Freeman, Legitimizng Racial Discrimination Through An-
tidiscrimination Law: A Crtical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978);
Perry, supra note 30.
35. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 34, at 26; Fiss, supra note 34, at 296. The need to check
covert sexual discrimination may exceed the need to prevent covert racial discrimination be-
cause society is more likely to accept employment decisions based on physical differences
between men and women, see, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 648 F.2d 1223, 1227
(9th Cir. 1981) (an employer "may have different weight requirements for men and women of
the same height to take account of physiological differences between sexes"); Longo v. Carlisle
DeCoppett & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (employers may adopt different hair grooming
requirements for men and women); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084
(5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (same), than decisions based on differences between blacks and
whites. Consequently, employers have a greater opportunity to hide sex discrimination be-
hind a screen of seemingly legitimate practices. Such requirements are prohibited by the
disparate impact doctrine, unless they are sufficiently job-related.
36. In disparate treatment cases, the Court has addressed this problem by adopting a
complex allocation of burdens of proof and burdens of bringing forth evidence. See Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Mendez, Presuaptions of Disriminatory Motives in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129 (1980).
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (the purpose of Title VII is to
achieve equal employment opportunity and remove past barriers to such equality); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973) ("G6gs was rightly concerned that
childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from
forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on
such citizens for the remainder of their lives.').
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wages."8 A plaintiff usually cannot trace the cause of a wage dispar-
ity to a single purposeful discriminatory act.3 9 Because it looks only
at the resulting harm, the impact doctrine does not require her to
present an original "blameworthy" act.
Third, disparate impact doctrine facilitates the elimination of
prejudice against women.4 ° Women are seen as less capable than men
partly because they hold lower paying and less prestigious jobs;4' to
the extent that Title VII reduces the gap in job prestige, it also
reduces prejudice. 42 Finally, eliminating the inequities which groups
that historically have been victims of prejudice have suffered may be
desirable in itself.
43
Wage-impact claims do, of course, entail some economic costs to
employers. An employment practice which disproportionately af-
fects women's wages may, for a variety of reasons, be more efficient
than any alternative means of setting pay. However, these ineffi-
ciency costs are not unique to wage-impact claims; all disparate im-
pact claims involve similar potential inefficiencies.' The courts,
38. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d
1094, 1097 (3d Cir. 1980). One commentator has classified such claims as comparable worth
claims based on perpetuation of past discrimination. Comment, supra note 11, at 1341-42.
39. See Brest, supra note 34, at 31-43. Moreover, even if the plaintiff could trace present
impact to particular past discrimination, the defendant would probably not be responsible for
that practice. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (noting that one reason why
blacks were less likely to pass Duke Power's tests was that they "have long received inferior
education in segregated schools").
40. "[L]aws having a disproportionate impact aggravate the already especially disad-
vantaged and isolated positions of blacks in American Society, and that social position of
blacks reinforces supremacist notions of 'inherent' white superiority, a superiority thought to
explain and to justify the privileged social position of whites." Perry, supra note 30, at 558
n.99. The same argument applies to the social positions of women in American society.
41. From a plaintiff's perspective, the inequality of roles perpetuates prejudices which
stigmatize women. See Brest, supra note 34, at 35. From this "victim's" perspective, the fact
that no one person can be blamed for the inequity is irrelevant. See Freeman, supra note 34, at
1052-57.
42. That society identifies certain jobs as "women's work" is not necessarily bad. The
problem arises because society undervalues that work, and channels women into it. See Hear-
ings On Job Segregation and Wage Discrination Before the US Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 164-79 (1980) [hereinafter cited as EEOCHearings] (testimony of Helen Hacker, Pro-
fessor of Sociology, Adelphi Univ.); Blumrosen, supra note 11, at 402-28.
43. "The disproportionate absence of minorities from certain positions-whether or not
itself the result of. . .discrimination-may conduce to discrimination in other areas." Brest,
supra note 34, at 43. Greater social equality also has a number of indirect benefits. Equality
may minimize costly social unrest. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEx.
L. Rav. 411, 456-64 (1973). Equality may appease those in the majority who have guilty
consciences. Also, sex prejudice prevents the labor market from functioning efficiently, and
thus reduces output of goods and services.
44. The disparate impact doctrine creates some economic inefficiency when it forces the
1090
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recognizing these inefficiencies, have created the "business necessity"
defense, which ensures that employers do not suffer too significant a
hardship by allowing them to implement employment practices that
are necessary to the maintenance of the business.45
Furthermore, wage-impact claims may encourage employers to
adopt subjective wage-setting practices. Subjective standards make a
prima facie case of disparate impact harder to establish because the
disparate effects of particular standards are not readily identified.
But this difficulty is also a general problem of disparate impact
claims.46 Courts have reduced the incentive to adopt subjective stan-
employer to adopt practices that are less profitable than those he was using. Comment, The
Business Necessity Defense To Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911,
919 (1979). The disparate impact doctrine may nevertheless be efficient for society as a whole
if social costs which otherwise would have flowed from the disparate results, see note 43 supra,
exceed the efficiency loss due to giving up the practice.
45. The requirements of the business necessity defense are unclear. The defense was
part of the Giggs opinion, which stated both that the questioned employment practice is
unlawful if it "cannot be shown to be related to job performance," and that "[t]he touchstone
is business necessity," Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971). See also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329, 331 n.14 (1977) (referring to both "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question," and "necessay to safe and efficient job performance" as standards
for permitting the employment practice) (emphasis added).
The lower courts have traditionally applied the apparently stricter business necessity
standard. See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971)
(the defendant must demonstrate that no "feasible or practical" alternative to the practice
exists), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652,
662 (2d Cir. 1971) (business necessity defense requires an "irresistible demand'). Some courts
have intimated that a balancing test applies, see, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) ("the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override"
the disparate impact), but the balance is weighted heavily against the employer.
The standard has recently shifted toward a less stringent job-relation test. The Supreme
Court, in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979), required
only that safety and efficiency be "significantly served" by the defendant's policy against
hiring methadone users. The Court did not elaborate on the standard by which courts should
decide when employers' legitimate goals are "significantly served." Two circuit courts have
since applied a similar standard. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior"); Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981) ("substantially promote the
proficient operation of the business').
For an overview of the business necessity defense, see Note, Business Necessity Under Title
VIIof the Cioil Rights Act of 196l: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974); Comment,
supra note 44.
46. A subjective scheme hides the factors an employer uses to make his decisions. In
that way, subjective standards make more difficult the plaintiff's task of identifying factors
which disproportionately affect women. See Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1981) (requiring a plaintiff to identify an "objective" factor to make out a disparate
impact claim).
Subjective schemes also make disparate treatment more difficult to prove. For example,
cases concerning college professors demonstrate that use of subjective criteria may result in
defendants routinely winningjudgments. See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F.
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dards by giving these standards little weight as a defense to a prima
facie case.
In sum, wage-impact claims serve the same social goals and create
the same problems as other disparate impact claims. Thus, as a pol-
icy matter, disparate impact doctrine should include sex-based wage
discrimination claims.
B. The Effect of the Fourth Equal Pay Act Defense on Wage-Imp act
Claims
While policy considerations strongly favor allowing wage-impact
claims, a literal interpretation of the fourth Equal Pay Act defense
would bar such claims. To make a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff
must identify a specific employment practice that, while facially neu-
tral, affects employees in a gender-dependent manner.8 By invoking
the impact doctrine, a plaintiff admits that a factor other than sex is
the most direct cause of the wage differential. The employer may
point to this factor and invoke the fourth defense.
Gunther provides some support for this interpretation of the fourth
defense.49 After warning that the fourth defense "could have signifi-
cant consequences for Title VII litigation," 50 Justice Brennan noted
that Title VII proscribes "'not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.'.
The fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act, however, .
confine[s] the application of the Act to wage differentials atrzibutable to
Supp. 1328, 1353-54 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 868
(D. Vt. 1976); Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357, 1359-60 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
But see Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979)
(woman professor proved she had been denied a promotion because of her sex), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
47. See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 616-17 (6th Cir.) (interviewing procedure
lacking objectivity cannot rebut a disparate impact showing), cert denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980);
Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir. 1972) ("Elusive,
purely subjective standards must give way to objectivity if statistical indicia of discrimination
are to be refuted.').
48. A plaintiff may not merely show a disparity between an employer's work force and
the local labormarket without identifying a questionable employment practice. If the plain-
tiff cannot identify a facially neutral practice, she must proceed under the disparate treat-
ment doctrine. See Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981).
49. At least one commentator reads Gunther as conclusively denying a wage-impact
claim. See Gould, The Supreme Court5s Labor and Emplqyment Docket in the 1980 Tnn. Justice
Brennanr Tenn, 53 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 66 (1981) ('The critical thrust of Justice Brennan's
opinion was that the Gnggs theory of liability, i.e., no intent necessary for a violation, could
not be used in sex-based wage discrimination cases under either Title VII or the Equal Pay
Act.").
50. Gunther v. County of Washington, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
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sex discrimination . ,5
However, Gunther also stressed that Title VII should be construed
to avoid denying a remedy to victims of employment discrimination,
unless Congress clearly mandates otherwise.5 2 This view of Title VII
conflicts with a literal interpretation of the fourth defense, which
would deny a remedy to many victims of sex-based wage discrimina-
tion. This conflict, and Gunther's explicit statement that it did "not
decide . . . how sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII
should be structured to accommodate the fourth affirmative de-
fense,"5 3 weigh heavily against reading Gunther as adopting this lit-
eral interpretation.54
A better interpretion of the fourth defense would use judicial in-
terpretation of the defense in Equal Pay Act cases as a guide to incor-
porating the defense into Title VII.55 The courts have held that
defendants in Equal Pay Act cases bear the burden of proving that
gender did not play a role in their wage decisions.56 Moreover, they
have held that facially neutral practices that perpetuate past societal
wage discrimination are not based on a "factor other than sex."
57
51. Id (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)) (emphasis added).
52. Id at 178.
53. Id at 171.
54. In Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 161 (E.D. Cal. 1981), the district
court read Gunther as limiting "the application of the fourth affirmative defense to 'bona fide
job rating systems.'" Id at 161.
55. Two courts have applied the disparate impact doctrine to sex-based wage discrimi-
nation. In Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981), the court held that a
medical insurance plan could violate Title VII because it provided an employee's spouse with
benefits only if the employee earned more than the spouse. Wambheim, however, did not
explicitly consider the effect of the fourth Equal Pay Act defense. In Kouba v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 523 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Cal. 1981), a district court held that use of salary in a priorjob as
a factor in setting wages did not satisfy the fourth defense because prior salary might reflect
the effects of past discrimination. Although Kouba was an equal pay for equal work claim
brought under Title VII, rather than a disparate impact claim, the court explicitly incorpo-
rated the disparate impact rationale into the fourth defense. Id at 161.
56. See, e.g., Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th
Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976); Futran v. Ring Radio Co., 501 F. Supp. 734,
738-39 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Marshall v. J.0. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1195 (N.D. Ohio
1979); see also Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of.1963: Making and Breaking a Pn'ma Fade 1are, 31
ARm. L. REv. 545, 584 (1978).
57. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974) (' That the company
took advantage of [ajob market in which women would work for lower wages than men] may
be understandable as a matter of economics, but its differential nevertheless became illegal
once Congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal work."); Marshall v. J.C.
Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1195-96 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (the fourth Equal Pay Act defense
"does not include... seemingly neutral factors which operate to perpetuate past discrimina-
tion.').
Coming Glass and Marshall both involve employers who previously had intentionally dis-
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And these cases may also require an employer to demonstrate that a
legitimate business concern justifies the wage differential.58 Incorpo-
rating these judicially implied limits on the fourth defense into Title
VII necessarily means that wage-impact claims should be permitted.
The Bennett Amendment was a "technical amendment"
designed to prevent conflicts between Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act.59 Judicial gloss on the fourth defense, in Equal Pay Act cases,
limits the scope of the defense. Similarly limiting the defense in Title
VII cases furthers both the broad remedial purposes of Title VII and
the conflict-avoidance purpose of the Bennett Amendment.
The only problem with this interpretation is that the Equal Pay
Act cases have not clearly articulated the nexus between the business
concern and the wage differential that will satisfy the fourth de-
fense. ' The Title VII "business necessity" defense, however, already
provides a readily available standard which is roughly consistent
with the interpretation of the fourth defense in Equal Pay Act
criminated against women-hence their language may be dicta as applied to practices that
perpetuate societal discrimination. But the reasoning of the cases does not distinguish be-
tween past discrimination by the employer and past societal discrimination. See Kouba v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 161 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
58. See Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Servs. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 104 (8th Cir.
1980) (en banc) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (once a plaintiff shows equal pay for equal work, the
employer must prove that "the education and experience requirements for the classification
in question are reasonably related to the job duties to be performed"); id at 100 (majority
opinion) (agreeing with the dissent about the job-relation requirement, but finding that the
requirement was met); EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1980) (pay differ-
ential based on an employee's experience and background is justified where the employer has
a business need for a worker with that experience and background); Homer v. Mary Inst., 613
F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (an employer may pay an unequal salary for equal work to
attract a particular employee whose experience and ability made him the best person for the
job); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 264 (3d Cir.) (to justify a wage disparity
under the fourth Equal Pay Act defense based on greater flexibility of male employees, an
employer must use that flexibility), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission takes the similar position that a "payment plan which establishes
separate and different 'male rates' and 'female rates' without regard to job content will be care-
fully examined." 29 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1981) (emphasis added).
The job relation of factors used to set wages is, to some extent, automatically built into
the equal work requirement of the Equal Pay Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.125 (1981) ("Possession
of a skill not needed to meet requirements of the job cannot be considered in making a deter-
mination regarding equality of skill.")
59. See note 24 supra.
60. Compare Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Servs. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 100 (8th
Cir. 1980) (holding that an employer's pay plan, which accounted for education and experi-
ence related to the job, satisfied the fourth defense) with Futran v. Ring Radio Co., 501 F.
Supp. 734, 739 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (to satisfy the fourth defense, an employer must show that a
talk show host's ability to generate revenues for a radio station explained the total wage
differential in question).
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cases. 6 The policy concerns that justify the defense-a balancing of
the need to remedy sex discrimination against the inequity of impos-
ing the costs of remedying societal discrimination on particular em-
ployers-apply equally to Title VII and Equal Pay Act cases. 62
Therefore, courts can and should interpret the fourth defense-in
both Title VII and Equal Pay Act cases-as equivalent to the Title
VII business necessity defense.63
III. COMPARABLE WORTH AS PROOF OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Although courts should allow wage-impact claims, whether proof
of comparable worth should state such a claim is an entirely separate
question.' Prior to Gunther, courts summarily rejected disparate im-
pact claims based on a comparison of job values.65 Gunther, which
explicitly left undecided the viability of such claims, 66 probably will
encourage them.67
61. The business necessity defense is interpreted differently in different circuits. See note
45 supra and accompanying text. The doctrine surrounding this defense, however, is far more
sophisticated than that surrounding the fourth Equal Pay Act defense. See Sullivan, supra
note 56, at 584-85. See also Note, sufira note 45, at 99-102; Comment, sufira note 44, at
918-20.
62. Sullivan, sufira note 56, at 584-87, has argued that the four affirmative Equal Pay
Act defenses should encompass Title VII doctrine.
63. Under this interpretation, the Bennett Amendment seems mere surplusage-the
fourth Equal Pay Act defense adds nothing to the substantive provisions of Title VII. This is a
disfavored statutory construction. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39
(1955), as the Gunther Court intimated. 452 U.S. at 170-71. When the Bennett Amendment
was adopted, however, Congress did not know how the courts would construe either the
Equal Pay Act or Title VII. Thus, it was reasonable for Congress to mandate that courts
allow the same affirmative defenses under both statutes. Although this interpretation adds no
substantive provisions to Title VII, it does not treat the Bennett Amendment as superfluous.
Id at 171.
64. Several commentators have proposed framing comparable worth as wage-impact
claims. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 11, at 459; Comment, EqualPayfor Compiarable Work, 15
HAsv. C.R.-C.L. L. R V. 475 (1980). These proposals ignore the requirements of the dispa-
rate impact doctrine. See note 69 infra.
65. See Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.) (requiring proof of
unequal pay for equal work under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (an employer's deviation from ajob evalua-
tion plan to account for market factors does not violate Title VII). - f
Courts hesitated to permit comparable worth suits because Congress had explicitly re-
jected a comparable work standard in favor of an equal work standard when it passed the
Equal Pay Act. See 108 CONG. REc. 14,767-68 (1962) (remarks of Reps. St. George and
Zelenko). After'Gunther, the equal pay for equal work standard does not apply to Title VII.
See note 24, sup'a and accompanying text. Hence, the rejection of "comparable work" in the
Equal Pay Act should not affect Title VII litigation.
66. 452 U.S. at 166 ("We emphasize at the outset. . . [that r]espondent's claim is not
based on the controversial concept of 'comparable worth'. . . . ") (footnote omitted).
67. See Note, In Pursuit of Wages Based on job Value--Gunther v. County of Washington,
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A. Comparable Worth and the Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine
All employers ultimately use market rates to set salaries.68 Plain-
tiffs may present comparable worth disparate impact claims by alleg-
ing that use of market rates is a specific employment practice that
adversely affects women.6 9 Under comparable worth theories, plain-
tiffs could establish disparate impact by showing that the local mar-
ket rate for their jobs is less than the rate implied by bona fide job
evaluations.70 To buttress this claim, they could show that market
rates generally tend to discount women's work, including their jobs,
because of sex prejudice.7' This approach seems to formally satisfy
29 DE PAUL L. REV. 907, 930 (1980) (9th Circuit opinion in Gunther lends support to compa-
rable worth claims.); Release of New Study on Comparable Worth, 108 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 10,
11 (1981) (statement by Nancy Perlman, chair of the National Committee on Pay Equity).
68. Market rates influence all attempts to establish job values. Even "objective" pay
plans reflect market factors. These plans often explicitly account for the present value of jobs
by basing evaluations on specified benchmark jobs. Even in systems derived from analyses
that do not explicitly depend on benchmark jobs, the choice of compensable factors and the
weights assigned to them must comport with society's notions of the relationships between
wages for various jobs. See Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH, ISSUES
AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 11, at 88-89; Schwab,Job Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts
and Practices, in COMPARABLE WORTH, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 11, at 62-70.
69. Commentators present policy arguments for or against allowing comparable worth
claims without considering legal constraints, except perhaps to point out that existing doc-
trine does not address the societal undervaluation of "women's work." See, e.g., EEOC Hear-
ings, supra note 42; COMPARABLE WORTH, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 11 (a
collection of essays on the premises and the potential impact of comparable worth theories);
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 11 (a report commissioned by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission on the feasibility of a comparable worth standard).
Several recent pieces have attempted to fit the comparable worth theory, and protection
against society systematically undervaluing "women's work," within Title VII doctrine. See,
e.g. , Blumrosen, sura note 11 (concluding that a showing of sex segregation of jobs should
establish a prima facie Title VII claim); Note, supra note 11 (Title VII should allow compara-
ble worth claims, which an employer may rebut by showing that he used a bona fide job
evaluation system to set wages); Comment, supra note 64 (a showing of unequal average sala-
ries of male and female workers should establish a disparate impact claim). These pieces do
not discuss how the policy considerations which comparable worth theories raise comport
with those underlying Title VII. Moreover, they ignore some of the requirements of the dis-
parate impact doctrine. In particular they neglect to discuss: (1) whether the fourth affirma-
tive Equal Pay Act defense precludes a disparate impact claim of sex-based wage
discrimination; (2) the requirement that a plaintiff pinpoint a particular employment prac-
tice which causes a wage disparity; and (3) the business necessity defense. See Gasaway, supra
note 11 (raising similar questions but not attempting to answer them); Nelson, Opton & Wil-
son, supra note 11 (a critique of the Blumrosen article which points out, among other things,
her inexact reading of the requirements of the disparate impact doctrine).
70. See Note, supra note 11, at 677 & n.108 (proposing a method by which a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie comparable worth case).
71. A plaintiff may need only to show a tendency of a questioned employment practice
to disadvantage women. Cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977). Psychological
experiments documenting that people value a job which they consider to be "women's work"
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the requirements for a prima facie disparate impact case.72
1. Conflict with requirements of the disparate impact doctrine.
Comparable worth claims, however, ignore the balance that the
disparate impact doctrine strikes. Inequality of results does not auto-
matically trigger liability under the disparate impact doctrine.73
Rather, a plaintiff must identify a "well-defined objective employ-
ment practice ' 74 and prove that this practice causes a disparity be-
tween male and female employees' opportunities. 75  This
requirement assures that Title VII does not unduly restrict an em-
ployer's prerogative to operate his business in a nondiscriminatory
manner.76 An employer, by avoiding practices which disproportion-
ately disadvantage women, can free himself from the threat of Title
VII litigation. Yet an employer can escape the threat of comparable
worth litigation only by eradicating all sex-based inequality-by
preferentially treating women.
less than a substantively identical malejob ,ould show such a tendency. See EEOCHearngs,
supra note 42, at 151 (testimony of Ann Viviano, Instructor, Psychology Dep't, Pace Univ.)
(work that women produce is evaluated lower than comparable male products).
72. The Supreme Court has stated that taking advantage of a job market which com-
pensates women at a lower rate than men will not satisfy the fourth Equal Pay Act defense.
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974). This does not necessarily imply
that a plaintiff may point to use of market factors as a violation of Title VII. Market rates
may reflect attributes of the job itself which legitimately explain pay differences. Once the
plaintiff proves equal work, this legitimate role for market factors vanishes. Outside of equal
work, this legitimate role persists.
73. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) ("the obligation im-
posed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race,
without regard to whether members of the applicant's race are already proportionately repre-
sented in the work force") (emphasis in original); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) (Title VII does not require that an employer's work
force be racially balanced). Senator Case, addressing concerns that Title VII might coerce
employers to lower hiring standards, stated that "Title VII would not require, and no court
could read Title VII as requiring, an employer to lower or change occupational qualifications
• . . simply because proportionately fewer Negroes than whites are able to meet them." 110
CONG. REc. 7246-47 (1964) (insertion into record).
74. Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981); see Adams v.
Gaudet, 515 F. Supp. 1086, 1125 (W.D. La. 1981); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 11 at
283-84 (an impact claim based on de facto job segregation proposes a "wholesale assault on
[an] employer's wage structure" rather than an "impact analysis of a specific employer
practice").
75. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (a plaintiff has the initial bur-
den of proving "a significant discriminatory pattern").
76. "[IThe causation requirement serves to distinguish from the totality of conditions
that a victim perceives to be associated with discrimination those that the law will address."
Freeman, supra note 34, at 1056; see also Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illiit Motive:
Theories Of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 42-99 (1977) ("proximate cause"
as basis for limits on disparate impact theory).
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Comparable worth theories therefore create a special threat of Ti-
tle VII litigation for employers. A court's decision whether a wage
disparity exists will necessarily be highly subjective and indetermi-
nate." These subjective decisions determine the threshold of proof
that a plaintiff must present to make out a prima facie case.78 The
subjectivity of this threshold impairs an employer's ability to know
what practices Title VII prohibits, and thus increases the threat of
litigation. This is especially true in comparable worth litigation be-
cause the employer may not have adopted any practice that is partic-
ularly peculiar to his business.
Under disparate impact doctrine, once a plaintiff presents a
prima facie case, the employer can invoke the business necessity de-
fense and escape liability.79 To establish the defense, an employer
must prove that his wage rates closely reflect the attributes of the jobs
in question. But an employer's wage rates may reflect more than job
related factors like skill, effort, and responsibility; they may reflect
complex influences like labor-management relations, societal values,
and individual employer or employee preferences. Moreover, even if
job related factors were the sole wage determinants, these factors
have no objective value independent of a market rate.80 Thus, most
77. In allowing a comparable worth claim, a court must choose between the plaintiff's
posited job evaluations and the defendant's wages; there is no unique objective standard
against which a court can compare the defendant's wages. The problem of subjectivity is
widely recognized. See, e.g., WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 11, at 94 ("no universal
standard of job worth exists, both because any definition of the 'relative worth' of jobs is in
part a matter of values and because, even for a particular definition, problems of measure-
ment are likely"); Hildebrand, The Market System, in COMPARABLE WORTH, ISSUES AND AL-
TERNATIVES, supra note 11, at 83 ("no 'value free' system of [job] evaluation has yet been
shown to exist'); Release of New Stud on Comparable Worth, 108 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 10, 10
(1981) (statement of Ann Miller, Professor of Sociology, Univ. of Pa., and chairperson of the
committee which issued the National Academy of Science Report on comparable worth)
("nor do we see the possibility of developing [a standard of universal job worth--such judg-
ments are ultimately subjective"); cf. Note, supra note 11, at 674-75 (job evaluation methodol-
ogy "assumes that . . . the compensable elements of job content can be identified and
measured').
Determining whether a well-defined employment practice causes a wage disparity would
not require subjective evaluations. A court could merely compare the wages that would result
without the practice with the employer's actual wages.
78. The subjective evaluations a court must make in comparable worth suits differ
from those in disparate impact suits where the proof that a disparity exists always turns on
objective statistical evidence. See note 31 supra. Thus, that courts frequently make subjective
evaluations in Title VII litigation does not necessarily imply that such decisions are appropri-
ate to establish comparable worth claims. But cf. Note, spra note 11, at 679, 680 & n.123
(complexity of comparable worth suits is not different from that of other Title VII suits, hence
comparable worth suits should be permitted).
79. Se notes 30-33 sura and accompanying text.
80. A job evaluation must assign weights to factors such as skill, effort, and responsibil-
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employers will be unable to invoke the business necessity defense in
comparable worth litigation.
Because the business necessity defense fails, a comparable worth
claim will require an employer either to raise wages for women's jobs
or hire more women for higher paying men's jobs.8 ' Indeed, given
the subjective nature of the comparable worth issue, an employer
takes a substantial risk of liability unless he equalizes the average
wages of men and women. Yet Title VII does not require preferential
treatment of women.8 2 By permitting comparable worth claims,
courts would effectively impose on employers the burden of preferen-
tial treatment, which Title VII explicitly refuses to impose.
2. Conflict with wage determination ioli.
Comparable worth claims also require that job-value, as mea-
sured by skill, effort, and responsibility, and other job related factors,
completely determine wages.83 This approach ignores several impor-
tant influences on wages, and if applied, would conflict with Title
VII policy.84
First, the requirement that job content determine job value to-
tally discounts the influence of organized labor on pay scales. The
strength of a labor union is not a job related factor, yet it certainly
affects pay levels.85 Judicial and EEOC determinations of "objec-
tive" job worth, under a broad-based comparable worth theory,
might undercut union ability to influence wages. 86 Congress care-
ity, and then determine the extent to which a job entails each factor in order to "measure"
job value. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 11, at 75. The assignments of weights to
factors, and factors to jobs, involve normative judgments. Id. at 75-77.
81. See Freeman, supra note 34, at 1099 (If courts presumed a disproportionate impact
whenever the average salaries of male and female employees differ, and applied the job-rela-
tion test in a strict manner, employers could escape liability only by raising women's salaries
until, on the average, they equalled men's salaries). For a statement of the policy differences
between disparate impact theory and affirmative action, see Perry, sufira note 30, at 561.
82. Title VII provides that no employer shall be required to give preferential treatment
"to any individual or to any group because of. . .sex. . . on account of [numerical] imbal-
ance" between his employees and the general workforce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976). Cf.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (clarifying that while Title VII does not
require preferential treatment of blacks, it does not prohibit voluntary affirmative action
programs).
83. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, srupra note 11, at 24-42; Note, supra note 11, at
674-75.
84. Comparable worth theories do not account for influences of internal labor markets,
the segmentation of the labor market, employer and employee preferences for job stability,
and labor union concerns. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, .rura note 11, at 44-52.
85. S e id at 31 n.18.
86. This does not mean that job evaluations can play no role in union shops. In fact,
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fully structured Title VII's provisions to preserve the nondiscrimina-
tory influences of organized labor.8 7 Courts should not construe
disparate impact doctrine to conflict with that specific congressional
intent.
Comparable worth theories also discount the productivity that an
employer derives from a job. That one job entails more skill, effort,
and responsibility than another does not imply that its value to the
employer must be greater as well. 8 Yet a job's value to employers
will affect the market rate. Moreover, current salary is only part of
an employee's total compensation package. Objectively similar jobs
may differ in nonpecuniary rewards, such as in personal satisfaction
and in potential for future rewards through advancement. Finally,
an employer's wage policy may reflect goals only tangentially related
to a dollar measure of job content, such as minimizing the collective
power of workers, providing incentives for workers to perform well,
reducing turnover in certain key positions, and minimizing training
costs.89 Comparable worth claims, because they require employers to
set wages according to "job-related" factors alone, conflict with Con-
gress's efforts to ensure that Title VII does not unduly infringe an
employer's rights to run a business in the manner which the em-
ployer believes is most efficient. 90
unions often demand job evaluations as a means of facilitating the formation and administra-
tion of collective bargaining agreements. See Northrup, Wage Selling and Collective Bargaining,
in COMPARABLE WORTH, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 11, at 109-11. These job
evaluations establish the relationships between the jobs in the shop; they do not establish
an objective worth of jobs. Moreover, the subjective job values arrived at reflect structural
features of labor markets, including union inputs. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supira
note 11, at 47.
87. The seniority defense, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), is the best example of non-job-
related arrangements which Title VII was tailored to leave intact. Congress noted that union
contracts often contained "last hired, first fired" provisions, and made clear that such provi-
sions do not violate Title VII even where such a provision would result in dismissal of a
disproportionate number of blacks. 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964) (Sen. Clark responding to
questions on Title VII). See, American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 50 U.S.L.W. 4364, 4367-68
(U.S. Apr. 6, 1982) (because Congress balanced labor and discrimination concerns when it
passed Title VII, a seniority system which disparately affects blacks is not unlawful). Con-
gress also explicitly rejected an amendment that would have prohibited discrimination
against non-union members, even though it recognized that such discrimination might ad-
versely affect blacks. See id. at 13,943-45 (1964).
88. Objectively determined job value would equal the going market wage rate in a per-
fectly competitive market. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 11, at 44-45. Competi-
tion does not characterize actual labor markets, however, because of incomplete information,
limitations on mobility, and institutional influences such as employer incentive programs. Id
at 45-47.
89. Id at 46.
90. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 203 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
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B. A Proposed Standard for Wage Discnmination Review
Despite the inconsistencies between comparable worth claims and
Title VII doctrine, without these claims Title VII does not effectively
address discrimination. Employers can discriminatorily assign values
to jobs unless, of course, they explicitly use gender in assigning these
valuesf' Moreover, the undervaluation of female jobs in the market
results, to some extent, from past discrimination,92 and the underval-
uation ofjobs that are universally perceived as "women's work" has a
stigmatic effect similar to that which results from the undervaluation
of an individual because she is female.93
To effectuate the remedial policies of Title VII, courts will have
to address the pervasive problem of wage depression for "female
jobs." The courts must adopt standards that comport with the poli-
cies which underlie Title VII. Although comparable worth impact
claims advance the Title VII policies which the judicially created
disparate impact doctrine serves,94 they intrude further into em-
ployer prerogatives and labor-management relations than Congress
intended. To prevent such intrusion, courts must reject disparate im-
pact claims based on job evaluations. 95 Barring such claims eviscer-
dissenting) ("Congress balanced the need for a remedy for wage discrimination against its
desire to avoid the burdens associated with governmental intervention into wage struc-
tures.'); 2 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963) ("management prerogatives,
and union freedoms . . . [are] left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible"). See a/so
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 (relying on fact that Title VII leaves man-
agement prerogatives intact to permit voluntary affirmative action plans).
91. See notes 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
92. See EEOCHearings, sura note 42, at 202-03 (testimony of Phyllis Palmer, Research
Associate, Business and Professional Women's Association) ("the low valuation of women's
work may be due to . .. [the fact] that men have been able to control public collective
activities while women have been primarily responsible for single family domestic activities');
Blumrosen, supra note 11, at 418-19 (reviewing reports that "both sexes tend to value men
and male characteristics, values, and activities more highly than those of women').
93. See, e.g., EEOCHeangs, supra note 42, at 214-23 (testimony of Carolyn Reed, Exec-
utive Director, National Committee on Household Employment, National Urban League)
(noting the stigma attached to household employment because it has traditionally been "wo-
men's work"); Brest, supra note 34, at 8.
94. Notes 34-43 supra and accompanying text discuss the purposes behind disparate
impact doctrine. Comparable worth theory aims to remedy many of the same harms, albeit
from another perspective. For example, the job market may channel women into lower pay-
ingjobs because women lack the requisite skills for higher paying positions. See EEOCtHear-
ings, supra note 42, at 273-93 (testimony of Mary Corcoran, Associate Professor of Political
Science, Univ. of Mich.). The disparate impact doctrine already prohibits an employer from
demanding such skills unless the skills are a business necessity. The comparable worth theory,
rather than remedying disparities in job composition, would increase the pay for the lower
paying job.
95. Cf.- Note, supra note 11 (implicitly proposing that an employer may use a bona fide
May 1982] 1101
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1083
ates the comparable worth approach. It does not, however, preclude
use of job comparisons as evidence of intentional discrimination.96
The broad notion of intent that disparate treatment cases adopt-
where gross statistical disparities may create an inference of inten-
tional discrimination 97-- provides a flexible standard by which the
courts can address the problem of depressed women's wages.
A comparison of job values which raises an inference that an em-
ployer intentionally discriminated does not require a court to impose
wage scales on an employer. An employer's pay plan should reflect
job content if all other factors remain constant. A discrepancy be-
tween job content and wages may indicate that gender prejudice in-
fluences an employer's wage decisions. As factors unrelated to job
content become increasingly similar, the inference of intentional dis-
crimination gets stronger." This inference arises not from a compar-
ison of the employer's pay plan with an ideal pay plan, but rather
from an internal discrepancy in an employer's pay plan.99 Hence,
courts may infer intentional discrimination without restricting an
employer's prerogative to structure pay plans in any nondiscrimina-
tory fashion.100
job evaluation system in order to rebut a comparable worth claim under Title VII). This
proposal eases the otherwise impossible burden the defendant faces in a comparable worth
case. See notes 82-92 supra and accompanying text. But, like other proposed comparable
worth approaches, this proposal would still require employers to set wages exclusively accord-
ing to job related factors.
96. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), holds that job value com-
parisons may be evidence of intentional discrimination. The Court refused to state whether
job value comparisons alone may establish a prima facie case. Id at 166 n.8. The Court
noted, however, the plaintiffs' contention "that the failure of the county to pay [them] the full
evaluated worth of theirjobs can beproven to be attributable to intentional sex discrimination."
Id. at 181 (emphasis added). This suggests that the Court viewed job comparisons as consti-
tuting only partial evidence of intent to discriminate. Cf. Gunther v. County of Washington,
623 F.2d 1303, 1321 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that job comparisons alone are insufficient to
establish a prima facie Title VII case), aafd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
97. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
98. "Unequal pay for equal work" claims represent the case where the inference is
greatest, since all factors, includingjob content, are equal.
99. Courts have begun to recognize claims under the disparate treatment doctrine
which rely solely on evidence of inconsistencies in an employer's pay practices. See, e.g., Wil-
kens v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1981), Taylor v. Charley Bros.,
25 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Greenspan v. Automobile Club of
Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Gunther itself was a disparate treatment case
based to a large degree on deviation of pay from the employer's job evaluation. See notes
21-23 supra and accompanying text.
100. Comparisons from which a court might infer intentional discrimination include:
(1) comparisons between actual pay and an employer's own job evaluation; (2) comparisons
which, independent ofjob evaluations, demonstrate that differences in jobs are not viewed by
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IV. CONCLUSION
Couno of Washington v. Gunther held that a plaintiff may bring a
Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim without proving une-
qual pay for equal work. The Court, however, avoided the issues of
whether sex-based wage discrimination claims can be brought under
the disparate impact doctrine, and whether comparable worth suits
are cognizable under that doctrine. This note has argued that courts
should allow disparate impact claims but deny comparable worth
claims. Comparison ofjob values, however, should be evidence from
which courts can infer intentional discrimination. Interpreting Title
VII in this manner will best further the social interests underlying
wage discrimination law.
Mark B. Seidenfeld
the employer as justifying the wage differential; and (3) comparisons where the relationship
beween jobs is universally accepted--the egregious cases. For example, if clerical supervisors
(mostly female) were paid less than messengers (mostly male) whom they supervised, that would
raise an inference of intentional discrimination.
Courts could decide how far the notion of inferred intent extends on a case-by-case basis.
For example, if a plaintiff shows that an employer pays women less than men in comparable
jobs, and that the job market is not clearing (i.e., the plaintiff's job is understaffed), a court
could infer that the employer had intentionally discriminated by keeping wages for the plain-
tiff's job below the clearing wage. This appears to be the situation for nurses in San Jose, Cal.
See .J. nurses vote to strike at two more hospitals, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 16, 1982, at 1, 20
col. 4.
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